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Abstract
Provision of most public goods (e.g., health care, libraries, education, police, re
protection, utilities) can be characterised by a two-stage production process. In the rst
stage, basic inputs (e.g., labour and capital) are used to generate service potential (e.g.,
opening hours, materials), which is then, in the second stage, transformed into observed
outputs (e.g., school outcomes, library circulation, crimes solved). As nal outputs are
also a¤ected by demand-side factors, conating both production stages likely leads to
biased inferences about public productive (in)e¢ ciency and its determinants. Hence,
this paper uses a specially tailored, fully non-parametric e¢ ciency model allowing for
both outlying observations and heterogeneity to analyse e¢ cient public good provision in
stage one only. We thereby employ a dataset comprising all 290 Flemish public libraries.
Our ndings indicate a statistically signicant link between the ideological stance of
the local government, wealth and density of the local population and source of library
funding (i.e., local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) and library productive
e¢ ciency (though the casual nature of this correlation cannot be fully ascertained at
present).
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tion, Libraries, Local govenment.
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1 Introduction
In much the same way that concerns over allocative e¢ ciency are at the heart of micro-
economic theory (e.g., Leibenstein, 1966; Frantz, 1992), allocative e¢ ciency in the public
sector has always been a major concern in public nance. Numerous studies, for example,
analyze whether local governments - which often have important responsibilities with respect
to education, housing, health care, social welfare, recreation, infrastructure and the environ-
ment (including refuse collection) (John, 2001) - have a tendency to over- or underprovide
public goods (see, e.g., the pioneering work of Brueckner, 1979, 1982, 1983 and many refer-
ences thereto). Moreover, scholars studying the decentralization of tasks from higher-level
governments to the local level often evaluate this evolution in terms of allocative e¢ ciency.
Smaller jurisdictions with more homogeneous populations are argued to increase allocative
e¢ ciency as they are more capable of matching the provision of public goods with the pref-
erences of their constituents (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972), while numerous "informal and
formal versions of the Tiebout model demonstrate that private allocative e¢ ciency tends to
be increased by Tiebout choice" (Hoxby, 2000, 1211).
In contrast, this paper concentrates on local government productive e¢ ciency.1 This has
received signicantly less attention in the decentralization literature thus far (for important
exceptions, see, e.g., Hoxby, 1999, 2000), even though one could argue that decentralization
is most fruitful when local governments are, all else equal, more productively e¢ cient than
higher-level governments (e.g., Geys and Moesen, 2009). This relative neglect is all the more
surprising given that the nancial constraints within which local governments are expected
to execute their (increasing) assignments have tightened signicantly over the past decades.
Indeed, given that tax- and decit-increases are often politically costly (e.g., Geys and Ver-
meir, 2008a, b), one way to deal with increasing tasks and tightening budget requirements is
to improve productive or technical e¢ ciency (understood in terms of providing a maximum
amount of output for a given level of inputs; see Koopmans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008).
We are clearly not the rst attempting to measure and explain local government produc-
tive e¢ ciency (for reviews, see Tang, 1997; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). Yet, we di¤er from
this previous body of work in three crucial respects. First, we build on important - but often
neglected - insights from the urban governance and public administration literatures to more
thoroughly describe the public sector production process prior to the actual analysis. These
1As in the private sector, e¢ ciency constitutes one among many aims; including e¤ectiveness, equity,
responsiveness, adequateness and appropriateness (Dunn, 2004). Our focus on productive e¢ ciency obviously
does not imply that it should take precedence over other aims of public service provision. Note also that we
will use the terms productive and technical e¢ ciency interchangeably throughout the paper.
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literatures illustrate that e¤ective public service provision depends on an active involvement
by the recipient of these services (e.g., Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al., 1981; Kiser, 1984; Parry,
1996). For example, schools can "supply little education without inputs from students", while
police forces have "very little capacity to a¤ect community safety and security without citi-
zen input" such as reporting crimes or testifying in court (Parks et al., 1981, 1003). Such
coproductionhas important implications for the measurement of technical e¢ ciency, as it
suggests that observable outcomes (e.g., library circulation, school results, waste collected,
res extinguished, crimes solved) - the most commonly employed output indicator in exist-
ing studies of public sector productive e¢ ciency2 - are inappropriate as they are not really
produced in a strict sense by the public service provider (see also Cordero-Ferrera et al.,
2008). We therefore propose to view public good provision as a two-stage production process
(adapted from Hammond, 2002) in which, rst, basic inputs such as labour and capital 
are translated into service potentialsuch as available materials and opening hours and
then, secondly, the latter are transformed into observable outputs such as school outcomes,
library circulation or crimes solved. Particularly in the rst stage of this process can the
public service producer be most directly held accountable for translating a given amount
of public expenditures into a maximum possible amount of service potential (whereas the
second stage is probably more appropriately analyzed in a supply-demand framework).
As a second contribution, we employ a recently developed fully non-parametric framework
and thus do not impose any a priori assumption on the production technology. This is
crucial given the di¢ culty - if not impossibility - to argue that the public good production
process follows one or another functional form. While our approach is closely related to Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978; Deprins et al., 1984), it goes
further than such models by allowing for outliers (following the order-m technique of Cazals
et al., 2002) and heterogeneity (building on the conditional e¢ ciency estimators of Daraio and
Simar, 2005, 2007). Note that reliance on such conditional e¢ ciency estimates is particularly
convenient as it does not require a separability condition (i.e., the assumption that the
exogenous environment does not inuence the level of basic inputs and service potential).
The nal model is based on De Witte and Kortelainen (2008), who extended Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007) to allow for (1) both discrete and continuous exogenous variables and
(2) statistical inference in the conditional e¢ ciency approach. As such, besides reducing
the impact of outliers and controlling for heterogeneity, we are able to non-parametrically
evaluate the strength (though not necessarily the causal nature) of the correlation between
exogenous characteristics and productive e¢ ciency.
The latter also constitutes our third contribution. Previous studies generally fail to evalu-
ate how the institutional environment in terms of socio-demographic, economic or political
2See, for example, Worthington (2001) for the case of education.
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characteristics a¤ects e¢ ciency, or look at this via an econometric two-stage approach (e.g.,
De Borger et al., 1994; Geys, 2006; Hemmeter, 2006; Borge et al., 2008). Both exclusion
of such background factors and their use in a two-stage approach, however, leads to biased
results and incorrect inferences (see, respectively, Battese and Coelli, 1995 and Kumbhakar et
al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). In this paper, we exploit the above-mentioned
non-parametric conditional e¢ ciency model to include the operational environment immedi-
ately in the e¢ ciency estimates. Relying on extensive public choice and political economics
literatures, we thereby focus on the following elements: (1) ideological stance of the local
government, (2) share of women in the local council, (3) wealth of the municipality, (4)
population concentration, and (5) source of public funding.
While our central argument - and the ensuing empirical approach - can be readily ap-
plied to various public goods, our empirical application exploits an exceptionally rich dataset
of (all 290) municipal public libraries in Flanders in 2007.3 The Flemish setting is particu-
larly attractive since nearly every municipality has its own library, generating a large and
diverse dataset. Moreover, as the central and regional governments in Belgium set the over-
all framework in which local public service providers operate, the latters work is largely
execution-oriented and devoid of value choices (in contrast to, say, the US, where the value-
component of local policy decisions is larger). This generates a situation that is particularly
conducive to e¢ ciency measurements as the value-content or neutrality of the inputs and
outputs then becomes less of an issue (see also Geys and Moesen, 2009). Finally, we focus on
libraries as local public library services are unlikely to be essential to individualschoice of
residence (for recent evidence, see Bhatt, 2010), unlike, for example, a jurisdictionspublic
education, tax policy or public safety. Moreover, selection of consumers by public libraries is
unlikely to occur (unlike in, for example, education or health care; e.g., Parry, 1996). This
is important since it strongly mitigates potential concerns about endogeneity and identi-
cation (more details below). Our ndings suggest that the ideological stance of the local
government, the wealth and density of the local population and the source of library funding
(i.e., local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) are signicantly correlated with an
e¢ cient generation of service potential. At odds with recent work on the e¤ects of female
representation on public policy (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004; Geys and Revelli,
2009; Svaleryd, 2009), the number of women in the local government or the presence of a
female mayor does not add to the explanatory power of the model, ceteris paribus. Still,
although, as mentioned, our case selection mitigates potential concerns about endogeneity
and identication, care should be taken to interpret these ndings as causal relations (we
return to this below).
3To facilitate the application in alternative settings, the R code underlying the present analysis is available
from the authors upon request.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
background and our main hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the estimation methodology,
while Section 4 discusses the institutional setting and data. Our ndings are presented in
Section 5. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Public good provision as a two-stage production process
A key characteristic of many public services is that "without the productive activities of con-
sumers nothing of value will result" (Parks et al., 1981, 1002). Such view of the importance
of citizens-consumers as co-producersof public service production and delivery rst devel-
oped among urban governance and public administration scholars in the early 1980s (e.g.,
Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al., 1981; Kiser, 1984; Percy, 1984). Although discussion about the
exact nature, origins and consequences of such coproduction continues (e.g., Alford, 2002;
Mitlin, 2008), the basic idea is that e¤ective public service provision depends on active in-
volvement by the recipient of these services. That is, schools require students(and parents)
e¤ort to produce decent exam results, health care provision can only succeed if doctorsand
nurses orders are followed by patients, waste collection proceeds faster when citizens ap-
propriately bag it and transport it to the curb, unemployment assistance programs stand
or fall with the active engagement of the (long-term) unemployed, ... Urban scholars have
extensively discussed similar relevance of citizen involvement for a wide and varied range of
local public services including re and police protection, libraries, tax collection, recreation,
and so on (for a review, see Percy, 1984).
Citizenscoproduction represents a convenient way of pointing out that public goods have
the consumers in their production function. This, however, has important implications for
measuring public service providerstechnical or productive e¢ ciency. Indeed, active involve-
ment by the recipient of the service implies that observable outcomes (e.g., library circulation,
school results, crimes resolved, res extinguished and so on) are not really producedin a
strict sense by the public service provider - and thus are inappropriate measures to evalu-
ate their technical (in)e¢ ciency (see also Cordero-Ferrera et al., 2008). Indeed, given the
importance of demand-side factors in the service production process, relying on observable
outcomes in productive e¢ ciency analyses may lead to strongly biased inferences of e¢ ciency
(for empirical evidence, see De Witte and Geys, 2010). For example, when observed library
circulation (i.e., the nal outcome) is low, a relatively high-cost library will appear ine¢ cient
when using circulation as the output variable in the analysis. Yet, it may at the same time be
very e¢ cient in translating its basic inputs (such as labour and capital) into books, opening
hours and so on. If so, using circulation as an output measure will lead it to be unduly
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described as productively ine¢ cient simply because it su¤ers from low demand in its area.
This is not to say that one should support locating such high-cost libraries in low-demand
areas. Clearly, this would be a waste of public resources (i.e. allocative ine¢ ciency). Rather,
the argument is that, from a purely productive e¢ ciency perspective, this library should be
recognized as being technically e¢ cient - and not be described as an underperformer for an
element beyond its control (i.e., public demand for its service).
To accurately evaluate public sector technical e¢ ciency and its determinants, we argue
that one should concentrate on that part of the production process that is fully under the
control of the service provider.4 We therefore propose to view public good provision as
characterized by a two-stage production process (adapted from Hammond, 2002). In a rst
stage, basic inputs  such as (expenditures on) labour and capital  are employed in the
production of what could be described as service potential (Bookstein, 1981; Hammond,
2002). For public libraries, one can think of, for example, collection size and opening hours;
in education, it may include teaching hours, teaching materials, school library; in health
care, one can think of the number of hospital beds and operating rooms, opening hours,
machinery (and similarly for other types of public services such as police, re protection,
water services, waste collection, and so on). In the second stage, this service potential is then
transformed into observable outputs. For libraries, this could reect book circulation and
request processing, for health services the number of patients cured, and for re and police
protection the amount of res extinguished and crimes solved, respectively. At this stage, the
outcome is clearly not solely determined by the public service provider, but also depends to
an important extent on the demandin a given area for the services provided. For example,
re services are only provided if there are res to be put out, while good exam results require
student input and library circulation a population that cares about reading. Evidently,
our distinction between service potential and nal outputs is reminiscent of the distinction
proposed by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966) between goods and commodities; where
goods are seen as intermediate outcomes provided by rms and subsequently transformed by
consumers into commodities that full their desires. In such view, food items in a supermarket
can be seen as goods, while individuals meals or nutrition are the commodity (or nal
outcome) (see also Kiser, 1984).
This distinction between two production phases of public good provision allows analyses
of technical e¢ ciency to concentrate on that stage of public good production where the ser-
vice provider has full control over the inputs and outputs (i.e., stage one). At this stage,
technical e¢ ciency can most directly be understood as translating a given amount of public
expenditures (on, say, labour and capital) into a maximum possible amount of service poten-
4Alternative approaches to deal with this problem, often based on advanced econometric techniques, are
reviewed and discussed with respect to productive e¢ ciency in the education sector by Cordero-Ferrera et al.
(2008).
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tial (whereas the second stage is probably more appropriately analyzed in a supply-demand
framework). This avoids the bias induced by using nal outputs that are inuenced by citizen
coproduction (see above).5 Moreover, and importantly, focus on this rst stage also mitigates
identication concerns raised, among others, by Hoxby (1999, 2000). Indeed, analysing the
e¤ect of Tiebout choice on local education outcomes, she relies on an instrumental variables
approach to separate variation "driven by exogenous factors that a¤ect the supply of school
districts" from that which "is endogenous to observed student achievement or that is driven
by the demand for school districts" (Hoxby, 2000, 1210, boldface added). Our exclusion of
demand-side factors by focusing on the rst-stage of the public good production process in
principle has an equivalent e¤ect on the models identication possibilities. Nonetheless, in
the absence of an instrumental variables technique (which, in e¤ect, has not been developed
yet for the empirical model we introduce below), it should be clear that it only mitigates
identication concerns and will not be able to fully resolve them.
Two potential limitations of our approach should be pointed out here. First, one might
argue that thus far we implicitly assume public service providers to provide services tting to
local preferences. In other words, decisions regarding service potential are assumed to reect
the characteristics of expected demanders. For example, service providers are less likely
to provide access during weekends in areas where everybody works weekends, while libraries
probably buy more (less) childrens books in communities with high birthrates (large share of
elderly). This, however, need not hold in reality and we fully agree that a library providing
unwanted services (e.g., books no one has an interest in reading, but which are the most
inexpensive available) should not be designated as fullling its task, even when it provides the
maximum possible amount of services for a given budget. Indeed, a more appropriate overall
benchmark would be to consider how the service provider performs in terms of the production
of services relevant for the socio-demographic make-up of the jurisdiction. However, this
argument introduces the appropriateness of services or the responsiveness of the local service
provider into the analysis (see also footnote 1), and thus goes beyond productive e¢ ciency
in a strict sense. Once again, it is important to stress that we are not claiming that these
additional elements are less important than productive e¢ ciency, but simply that analyses
of pure productive e¢ ciency should regard the appropriate framework and not implicitly
encompass such e¤ects.
Second, the clear distinction made above may not be all that clear in reality and public
service providers could be argued to generally have some inuence or control over the second
stage of the production process. For example, librarians have an important role to facilitate
5Referring once more to Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966), our focus on stage one of the public good
production process is similar to arguing that the productive e¢ ciency of private-sector rms is best evaluated
using goods and not commodities as the rms output. This is, unsurprisingly and uncontroversially,
exactly what scholars of private-sector productive e¢ ciency have done for decades.
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or actively promote reading through the amount and quality of assistance programs, courses
and/or lectures o¤ered; re services are involved in raising awareness of re risk and preven-
tion; and so on. Still, such demand-inuencing activities by service providers could within
our framework be seen as rst-stage outputs (i.e. service potential). While they thus do not
invalidate our suggestion to focus on stage one only (because accountability is much more
clear-cut here than in stage two), they do potentially a¤ect the interpretation of the ine¢ -
ciency measured at stage one. Indeed, if this second-stage inuence of the service provider is
ignored or no appropriate measures for such often intangible services are included, the basic
inputs used in the production of programmatic inputs are overstated and the resulting e¢ -
ciency measure at stage one overestimates true ine¢ ciency. The key requirement in avoiding
this bias would be to identify those inputs specic to stage one alone, or include variables
accounting for both tangible and intangible service potential in the analysis.6
2.2 Determinants of e¢ cient public good provision: Hypotheses
Now that we have a clear understanding of the appropriate inputs and outputs when analyz-
ing e¢ cient provision of public goods, it remains to describe what might explain variations
in e¢ ciency across jurisdictions. Based on extent political economy and public choice liter-
atures, we thereby concentrate on the institutional (i.e., political, socio-demographic as well
as nancial) environment in which public service providers (in this case, public libraries)
operate. In the remainder of this section, we informally motivate the empirical application
below by discussing how various local circumstances might be linked to local public library
e¢ ciency.
Firstly, the political environment is likely to matter because (1) right-wing parties and (2)
male politicians might have di¤erent priorities compared to, respectively, left-wing govern-
ments and female politicians. This prediction follows from a large political economy literature
stating that ideology determines politicianspolicy preferences (e.g., Hibbs, 1977), as well as
from more recent evidence indicating that gender is an important indicator of policy prefer-
ences (e.g., Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002) and determines policy outcomes
(e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004; Geys and Revelli, 2009; Svaleryd, 2009). Specically,
this literature suggests that the latter groups - i.e. left-wing and female politicians - tend
to be more egalitarian and socially conscious. Translated to the present setting, this could
lead left-wing and female politicians to be more inclined to focus on non-economic benets
of libraries (i.e., supplying the opportunity to read for the less well-o¤, stimulating the popu-
lation to read more extensively, etc.), thereby putting more pressure on local public libraries
to maximize their service potential (given the limited budget). In other words, for a given
6Note that ignoring potential variation in the quality of service potential across service providers would
have similar e¤ects.
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budget, they might be more likely to push for higher service potential.
Still, a second channel through which the political environment might matter is that left-
wing parties often have close links to (public sector) trade unions. As a result, they might
experience a stronger motivation to create rents for public sector unions (Grossman and
Helpman, 2001). This could result in shifting existing inputs towards labour (i.e. more sta¤,
less books) or to increasing the librarys overall budget to support additional employment
(Mueller and Murrell, 1986). In either case, however, it is not immediately clear how such
budget re-allocation or expansion would a¤ect librariesproductive e¢ ciency. Indeed, neither
need imply a less productive e¢ cient use of funds unless one is willing to assume, say, that
higher labour usage is necessarily detrimental to productive e¢ ciency.
This discussion yields a rst hypothesis:
H1: Library e¢ ciency is a¤ected by a) the ideological stance of the local government and
b) the share of women in the local council.
The municipal socio-demographic make-up is likely to a¤ect library e¢ ciency through its
inuence on the demand and willingness to pay for cultural goods. Both of these generally
rise with income (e.g., Throsby, 1994; Schulze and Ursprung, 1998), such that high-income
residents may constitute a special interest group striving for cultural provisions(Werck et
al., 2008, 47). They may therefore pressure local public libraries to maximize their service
potential given budgetary constraints. Related, distance is often argued to play a crucial
role in deciding whether or not to visit a cultural event (e.g., Verhoe¤, 1992; Boter et al.,
2005; De Graa¤ et al., 2009; Bhatt, 2010). High concentration of population, by reducing
the average cost of travelling to the library, thus increases the group of potential users of the
librarys services. Moreover, lower travel costs can be argued to increase the option valueof
library services.7 As such, for a given population size, urban areas (which are more densely
populated) may have a larger share of its population interested in and striving for the e¢ cient
public provision of cultural goods (in this case, library services). In both cases, one could
interpret the variablese¤ects also in terms of a monitoring argument (see also below): i.e.
with more people likely to use libraries, monitoring of how the library is using its resources
is likely to increase.
We should note, however, that the possibility of congestion (for early analyses of con-
gestion in public good provision, see, e.g., Brueckner, 1981; Hochman, 1982; Oates, 1988)
may not only limit service provision when demand is very high (a¤ecting the librarys nal
output), but might also limit the force of the previous arguments. Indeed, expectation of
congestion may well reduce individuals propensity to pressure local service providers for
7This follows from standard option pricing theory. Specically, a decrease in the strike priceof an option
(e.g., through lower travel costs) to acquire a given underlying commodity (i.e., library services) increases its
value (see also Werck et al., 2008).
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e¢ cient provision by diminishing their expected benet of the service: i.e. the benet of the
service becomes discounted by the probability of not achieving it due to congestion. This is
supported by studies showing reduced willingness-to-pay as well as willingness-to-travel when
expected congestion increases (e.g., McConnell, 1977; Menz and Mullen, 1981; Ashworth and
Johnson, 1996; for a review relating to cultural resources, see Noonan, 2003).
This discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Library e¢ ciency is a¤ected by a jurisdictionsa) wealth and b) population density.
Finally, we know from principal-agent theory that monitoring reduces information asym-
metries between principal and agent. Indeed, this literature shows that under perfect moni-
toring a rst-best solution can still be reached. In other words, there is a strong disciplining
e¤ect of monitoring that - by limiting possibilities for wasteful spending and rent extrac-
tion by the agent - is strictly welfare-improving (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Holmström, 1979). Recent experimental evidence generally supports this
prediction (e.g., Nagin et al., 2002; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Importantly, monitoring
is likely to be higher when a larger share of library spending derives from local sources (i.e.,
fees and municipal subsidies) rather than subsidies from higher-level governments. The rea-
son lies in a form of scal illusion, whereby voters fail to fully understand that grants from
higher-level governments have to be nanced through tax revenues by these governments as
well (and that they will at least partly provide these resources). Such an imperfect mapping
of consumers and nanciers of library services (or, in other words, when scal institutions
are not built on the principle of scal equivalence; Olson, 1969) reduces the incentive to
act as e¢ ciency guards. It is, after all, perceived to be other peoples money that is being
wasted, and voters may well care about government (in)e¢ ciency only when they are directly
confronted with the tax bill for public good provision. In other words, local public libraries
accountability to the public (for fees and charges) and higher-level governments (who pro-
vide grants) may di¤er. Applying this line of argument to our setting, libraries are more
likely to value the careful use of public money when it originates mainly from own revenue
sources rather than external transfers(Geys et al., 2010, 266). This gives our third and nal
hypothesis (for similar arguments, see Hoxby, 2000; Hemmeter, 2006):
H3: Library e¢ ciency is higher when resources derive to a larger extent from own revenues.
3 Empirical methodology
To estimate e¢ ciency in the rst stage of the library production process and to determine
its politico-economy correlates (which are in the remainder considered as exogenous from the
librarys point of view), we could in principle employ several modelling techniques. However,
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a closer look at the data and hypotheses limits the possibilities. First, we should focus on
a non-parametric model as there is no a priori information on the appropriate production
technology for public services. In other words, we have no reason to believe that the relation-
ship between the inputs, outputs and exogenous characteristics follows a specic functional
form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, Translog, Fourier, ...). Although non-parametric models have a
lower rate of convergence, they have been shown to be more consistent compared to wrongly
specied parametric models (Kneip et al., 1998). Second, as we have no information on price
variables, we have to rely on a branch of non-parametric models particularly designed for
public performance analysis: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; Charnes et al., 1978) and
Free Disposal Hull (FDH; Deprins et al., 1984). Finally, given that we want to control for het-
erogeneity and test for the inuence of the exogenous environment on productive e¢ ciency,
the choice of modelling techniques is further narrowed to conditional e¢ ciency estimators
(Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007) and, in particular, conditional e¢ ciency models that allow
for discrete and continuous exogenous variables (De Witte and Kortelainen, 2008).
The model starts from the set n of observed combinations of inputs x (x 2 Rp+) and
outputs y (y 2 Rq+). The set of all feasible input-output combinations denes the production
technology: 	 =

(x; y) 2 Rp+q+ j x can produce y
	
: To determine the e¢ ciency of the eval-
uated libraries, we start from the best practice observations, i.e., the libraries that are using
the least inputs x for a given amount of outputs y (this is the so-called input-orientation; for
alternative orientations, see Fried et al., 2008). These best practice observations constitute
the best practice frontier, i.e., the border of the production technology 	: The ine¢ ciency 
of the evaluated entity (x; y) is estimated as the distance to the best practice frontier:
(x; y) = inf f j (x; y) 2 	g (1)
where the input e¢ ciency measure (x; y)  1 is the proportionate decrease of inputs, which
the library operating at level (x; y) should attain in order to be considered e¢ cient(i.e.,
(x; y) = 1).
Two options now arise. One could impose convexity on the production possibilities (as in
DEA) or not (as in FDH). Not imposing convexity clearly implies a more general approach.
Moreover, there are no valid theoretical arguments for assuming a priori that production
possibilities are truly convex (Cherchye et al., 2000, 263-264) and some empirical studies
suggest violations of the convexity hypothesis (e.g., Hasenkamp, 1976). Hence, as there is no
clear justication in our application to estimate a convex hull around the data, we concentrate
on the FDH model. The FDH model estimates the production possibility set as:
	^FDH =

(x; y) 2 Rp+q+ j y  yi; x  xi; (xi; yi) 2 n
	
: (2)
The FDH estimator for the Farrell input-oriented e¢ ciency score is obtained by replacing 	
with 	^ in equation (1).
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However, a major disadvantage of the traditional non-parametric FDH model is that all n
observations in the sample n are considered to be potential best practices: Prob((x; y) 	) =
1. Therefore, atypical observations (e.g., due to measurement errors, very atypical structure
of the entity, and so on) heavily inuence the best practice frontier and, as a direct result,
the e¢ ciency scores. To reduce the inuence of these atypical observations, we follow Cazals
et al. (2002) in estimating the FDH e¢ ciency of equation (1) relative to a partial frontier
constituting of m < n observations. By repeatedly drawing (B times) with replacement a
subset of m observations among those xi such that yi  y and averaging the e¢ ciency scores
relative to these B subsets, we obtain a so-called robust e¢ ciency estimate m(x; y) [robust
in the sense that the e¢ ciency scores are more robust to outlying observations]. The robust
estimates m(x; y) are no longer bounded by 1 as the evaluated observation is not always
included in the reference set. These super-e¢ ciente¢ ciency scores (i.e., if m(x; y) < 1)
indicate that the observation is using less inputs than the average m evaluated observations
in its reference set. As such, the super-e¢ cient observation is doing better than what would
be expected.8
The robust e¢ ciency approach of Cazals et al. (2002) proves extremely convenient to
incorporate the exogenous environment. Traditional non-parametric models su¤er from a
separability condition in that the operational environment is assumed not to inuence the
inputs and outputs. However, in real life applications, this is clearly unrealistic. The condi-
tional e¢ ciency approach, developed by Cazals et al. (2002) and Daraio and Simar (2005,
2007), allows to incorporate the exogenous environment. Basically, while using the robust
e¢ ciency model described above, the idea is to draw the subsample of size m in such a way
that similar observations have a higher probability of being drawn. In practice, one obtains
weights by estimating a kernel density around the evaluated exogenous characteristics. Hence,
the resulting conditionale¢ ciency estimates m(x; y j z) compare like with likes. As the
seminal contributions did not allow for multivariate analysis of both discrete and continuous
exogenous variables, De Witte and Kortelainen (2008) extended the approach. Basically,
their approach uses mixed (i.e., both discrete and continuous) Kernel smoothing around the
exogenous variables such that for every observation the probability of being similar to the
evaluated observation is known.
A second advantage of the De Witte and Kortelainen (2008) extension - crucial for our
analysis - arises from the possibility for statistical inference concerning the exogenous vari-
ables. This extends the original contribution of Daraio and Simar (2005), which allowed for
a graphical inference (i.e., favorable or unfavorable), to estimating a non-parametric p-value
(using an on bootstrapping based approach). Similar as in Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007),
8Following the literature (e.g., Daraio and Simar, 2007), we select the size of the partial frontier m as the
value of m as of which the percentage of super-e¢ cient observations is only decreasing marginally with m.
In our application, this corresponds to m = 50 (whereas n = 290, see below).
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the procedure is implemented by estimating the relation between the exogenous variables and
the ratio of the conditional m(x; y j z) to the unconditional m(x; y) e¢ ciency. Indeed, if
an exogenous variable shows an unfavorable correlation with performance, then m(x; y j z)
(i.e., e¢ ciency when taking z into account) will be larger than the unconditional e¢ ciency
m(x; y) for large values of z compared to small values of z (Daraio and Simar, 2007). Non-
parametrically bootstrapping this non-parametric regression allows us to obtain statistical
inference (in particular, p-values) on the correlation between the environmental variable and
the e¢ ciency score (which, clearly, does not necessarily constitute a causal e¤ect).9
4 Institutional setting and data
Our empirical application exploits an exceptionally rich dataset of (all 290) municipal public
libraries in Flanders in 2007. The data derive from the Department Social Development and
Local Cultural Policy(Afdeling Volksontwikkeling en Lokaal Cultuurbeleid) of the Flemish
Regional government. They collect - and make publicly available - information on library
revenues (e.g., subsidies, nes and fees), expenditures (on personnel, infrastructure, library
collection maintenance), collection size (e.g., books, CDs, DVDs, and so on) and operations
(i.e., circulation, requests, and so on) since 1998. We employ the most recent data available
(i.e., 2007) as a change in the data collection methodology in 2006 makes the resulting data
imperfectly comparable across time. Data on opening hours are unfortunately not centrally
collected and have been brought together by contacting all 290 libraries.
Given that FDH-based approaches - as the one employed here - tend to be sensitive to
the number of inputs and outputs included (inclusion of more inputs and outputs increases
the number of e¢ cient observations; see Kneip et al., 1998), we opt for three input and four
output variables. As inputs, we use expenditures on (1) personnel, (2) operating expenditures
(Opex; mainly maintenance of the collection) and (3) infrastructure.10 It is important to note
at this point that charitable donations to and employment of volunteers in public libraries are
uncommon in Flanders (in contrast to, for example, the US) and are, as such, not included
in the analysis. These inputs, which fully exhaust the library expenditure budget, are used
to provide (1) youth books, (2) ction and non-ction books and (3) other media (CD,
DVD, VHS, CD-ROM) during (4) a given number of hours per week. Hence, we use three
9Causality and endogeneity issues are traditionally dealt with by a parametric instrumental variables
(IV) approach. However, in a non-parametric setting, IV are technically impossible as e¢ ciency estimators
allowing for instruments are not yet developed (neither for the non-parametric estimator used here, as for
the parametric / semi-parametric alternatives available in the literature; see Fried et al., 2008).
10This infrastructure spending does not refer to big investment projects (such as major renovations or
additions to the library buildings), which tend to be lumpy and time-specic. Instead, it measures the
annual, contemporaneous expenditure on infrastructure that occurs because books must be housed in an
enclosed space and larger book collections require a larger space with higher maintenance costs.
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collection-related variables (expressed in number of books) as indicators of library service
potential and add, as a fourth output, the total number of opening hours per week (since this
proxies the actual accessibility of the library collection for potential borrowers).11 We should
thereby note that although the three former output variables correspond to stock measures,
which may benet older libraries, the variable returns to scale approach employed in our
FDH model smoothly accounts for this (see Fried et al., 2008). Descriptive statistics of the
variables employed are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2007 (n=290)
Average St. Dev Min Max
Inputs (in e)
Personnel 366539 474973 52914 4698859
Opex 70725 80184 5897 609432
Infrastructure 66827 217529 103 1794090
Outputs (in absolute amounts)
Opening hours per week 24 10 10 51
Youth books 25120 20800 4602 161986
Fiction and non-ction books 40852 38909 6806 285218
Media (CD, DVD, VHS, CD-ROM) 33455 59187 0 523144
Operational environment
Ideological complexion ICG (0-10 scale) 5.022 0.727 2.500 6.300
Female in council (%) 0.336 0.078 0.080 0.600
Female mayor (dummy) 0.093 0.291 0 1
Income (in 1000e) 12.930 1.390 9.547 17.536
Population (total in absolute amount) 19780 20034 2337 235143
Population density (per km2) 527 427 62 3053
Subsidies Flanders (%) 0,833 0,102 0,165 0,979
To evaluate the three central hypotheses derived in Section 3.2, we examine the (1)
ideological stance of the local government, (2) share of women in the local council, (3) wealth
of the municipality, (4) population concentration, and (5) source of public funding. These
are measured as follows:
First, we measure the Ideological Complexion of the local Government (ICG) as ICG =
11Clearly, the service potential of a library goes beyond these four variables and can be thought to also
include the amount and quality of assistance programs, courses, lectures and/or exhibitions o¤ered. Unfortu-
nately, however, data for such outputs are unavailable. As such, to the extent that basic inputs are employed
for the provision of such services, our analysis is likely to over-estimate true technical ine¢ ciency in stage
one of the public service production process (see above).
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i=1 (pi:Complexioni), where pi is the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor and
Aldermen (i.e., the local government) and Complexioni refers to the ideological position of
this party on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10). The data concerning a partys ideological
position were obtained from Buelens et al. (2008) and are based on a self-placement survey
asking presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities to locate their party on
an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right). The gures range from 2.0 (Groen!) to
6.3 (Open VLD) (the extreme-right-wing party Vlaams Belang was not represented in any
local government and is therefore not in the dataset).
Second, to measure the inuence of female representation, we use two operationalizations.
The rst measures female representation as the share of female members in the municipal
council (the local parliament). The more women are elected into the council, the more likely
it is that female preferences are translated into actual policies. The second operationalization
attempts to establish whether female preferences are more likely to come about when there
is a female mayor. In this case, we dene female representation using an indicator variable
equal to 1 when the mayor is female, 0 otherwise.12
Third, real taxable per capita income (in e1000) is included to assess whether e¢ ciency
di¤ers in wealthier municipalities. Population density (measured as inhabitants per km2) is
taken up as a measure for the degree of urbanization.
Finally, libraries are a heavily subsidized public service in Flanders. A large share of these
subsidies derives from the Flemish Regional government, which provides each municipality
with a basic subsidyof 6e per inhabitant (with a minimum of 50,000e) towards the nancing
of its library personnel. These subsidies constitute no less than 83% of total library revenues
on average (though varying between 16.5% and 97.9%; see Table 1). The remaining revenue
is provided by municipal subsidies and various alternative resources such as membership fees,
borrowing fees and nes. We include the share of regional subsidies in the total library budget
to evaluate the third hypothesis, i.e. whether e¢ ciency is higher (lower) when resources derive
to a larger extent from own revenues (higher-level government subsidies).
5 Results
The results of the e¢ ciency estimations are summarized in Table 2. In column 1, we present
the results when we do not account for the exogenous environment (i.e., unconditional
e¢ ciency). We nd an average e¢ ciency score of 0.79. This indicates that, on average,
Flemish local public libraries would have to decrease their inputs by approximately 21% in
12Still, the data do not allow us to interpret our ndings as causal evidence in favour of female inuence.
Indeed, women might simply get voted into o¢ ce more often in municipalities that have a more egalitarian
population. As such, it might be underlying di¤erences in popular preferences (rather than womens policy
preferences as such) causing both a higher share of female councillors and more e¢ cient libraries.
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order to produce their outputs equally e¢ cient as the best practices. There is, however, a very
large variation in the performance across libraries, as can be seen from the sizeable standard
deviation around this average ine¢ ciency. Moreover, some e¢ ciency scores are signicantly
larger than 1 (i.e., m(x; y) < 1). Hence, some observations can be viewed as super-e¢ cient:
they perform better than the average m observations in their reference sample.
To examine Hypotheses 1 to 3, we develop ve alternative conditional e¢ ciency models. In
Model 1, we examine the correlation between the e¢ ciency score and ideological stance, share
of female politicians in the local council, average income, and population concentration via a
nonparametric bootstrap procedure (see above). Model 2 adds population size to this baseline
model, in order to check whether any population concentration e¤ect not merely derives from
a larger population as such. Model 3 adds a dummy variable for female mayors to assess
whether this adds to the explanatory power of the model after controlling for overall female
representation in the local council (as in Model 1). To test Hypothesis 3, we include the
percentage of regional subsidies in total library revenues, while controlling for the ideological
preferences (in Model 4) and average income (Model 5) of the municipality. A systematic
presentation is given in Table 3.
Once we account for the exogenous environment (i.e., conditional e¢ ciency), our earlier
conclusions change in two important ways (results summarized in columns 2 to 6 of Table
2). First, the average e¢ ciency score no longer signicantly deviates from 1. Second, the
standard deviation around this mean reduces signicantly. Both results indicate that a large
part of the variation in ine¢ ciency observed in the unconditional e¢ ciency estimates is related
to di¤erences in the exogenous factors introduced.
These summarized results, however, do not allow any statements regarding Hypothesis
1-3. Thus, we represent the full estimation results for all ve conditional models in Table
3. We thereby consider the e¤ect on the median, rather than the mean, as the former is
less inuenced by extreme values. Due to the structure of the non-parametric bootstrap,
we only present whether the exogenous variable is signicantly (un)favorably correlated with
e¢ ciency (since the marginal coe¢ cient on the median is less meaningful; see De Witte
and Kortelainen, 2008). Finally, before discussing the ndings, we should repeat that care
should be taken with a causal interpretation of our ndings. While our specic case selection
and the separating out of demand-side e¤ects mitigates concerns about endogeneity and
identication (see above), the impossibility of employing an IV approach (see footnote 9
above) should induce due caution.
A rst nding observed throughout all specications Table 3 is that right-wing councils are
associated with a statistically signicantly lower level of public library productive e¢ ciency,
ceteris paribus. Such nding is consistent wit the idea that left-wing governments care more
about maximizing library service potential (under a given budget). It appears at odds with
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Table 2: Order-m e¢ ciency score (N=290)
Unconditional Conditional
(robust FDH) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Average 0.7892 1.0507 0.9891 1.0078 1.1082 1.0096
St. Dev. 0.6575 0.1946 0.1294 0.1606 0.2394 0.2029
Min 0.1965 0.5315 0.4778 0.5061 0.5018 0.5019
Max 5.4843 2.4027 2.0493 2.4284 2.0760 2.0093
Table 3: Inuence of the exogenous environment on service potential of libraries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ICG unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable
(<2E-16) *** (<2E-16) *** (<2E-16) *** (0.0783 * (0.060) *
Female council favorable favorable unfavorable
(0.235) (0.372) (0.540)
Income favorable favorable favorable favorable
(0.025) ** (<2E-16) *** (0.020) ** (<2 E-6) ***
Population density favorable favorable favorable
(0.090) * (<2E-16) *** (0.010) ***
Population (total) favorable
(0.830)
Female mayor unfavorable
(0.170)
Regional subsidies unfavorable unfavorable
(0.045) ** (0.057) *
Note: n=290; Bootstrapped p-values between brackets; ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%
and 10%-level.
17
a prediction under which such governments would be mainly interested in expanding local
public budgets to appease public-sector unions (although such hypothesis would also require
the assumption that unions are rent-seekrs, which, obviously, need not be true).
Secondly, our ndings are also consistent with the relation brought forward in Hypothesis
2. Municipalities with higher income and urbanization levels (i.e., more densely populated)
have better performing libraries. The latter is not driven by population size. Indeed, when
including population size in the estimation (Model 2), this turns out to be insignicant, while
the statistical signicance of population concentration remains una¤ected.
Thirdly, our results for the regional subsidies variable are in line with the expectation
expressed in Hypothesis 3. Libraries turn out to have a higher service potential for a given
budget in municipalities where library revenues derive to a larger extent from local resources
(i.e., municipal subsidies, fees and nes). This could indicate that incentives for monitoring
are undermined when a larger share of income derives from higher-level government subsidies.
This supports Hemmeters (2006) ndings for a sample of 3308 US library systems. It also
links to recent ndings by Geys et al. (2010, 265), who show that "the e¢ ciency-enhancing
e¤ect of voter involvement" in German municipalities is signicantly reduced when a larger
share of local revenues comes from intergovernmental subsidies.
Finally, and somewhat at odds with a recent and quickly expanding literature linking
female representation to changes in public policy outcomes, we cannot establish a robust nor
signicant link between the share of female representatives in the local council and library
e¢ ciency. That is, although the share of female representatives is positively related to median
e¢ ciency in two of the three models where it is included, its coe¢ cient estimate always fails
to be statistically signicant. A similar absence of statistical signicance is reached when
examining the gender of the mayor (Model 3). Female mayors are not associated with a
signicantly higher level of library performance, ceteris paribus.13
6 Conclusion
Economic e¢ ciency in terms of maximizing output for a given level of inputs (e.g., Koop-
mans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008) has recently become an increasingly important element in
public good provision. This has lead to a concomitant increase in scholarly attention for the
determinants of such e¢ ciency. We added to this burgeoning literature in three ways.
First, we characterized public good provision as a two-stage production process. One
stage translates basic inputs into service potential, while a second stage describes how these
13One potential explanation for this non-nding might be that municipalities with high female representa-
tion also tend to have more left-wing governments (assuming women are more likely to run - and be elected -
on left-wing party lists). This, however, is not supported by the data. Indeed, while we do nd the expected
negative correlation between ICG and fcouncil, this relation is rather weak (r=-0.1140; p=0.07).
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are transformed into observed outcomes. This separation is crucial to accurately dening
inputs and outputs in the analysis of productive e¢ ciency (and thus determines the accuracy
of the results from such analyses). Indeed, as the second stage outcomes are inuenced by
public demand (and thus in part lie beyond the control of the public service provider), they
are inappropriate to evaluate the pure productive e¢ ciency of public good provision. Hence,
we argued that one should concentrate on the rst stage (in which the production of service
potential is fully under control of the service provider).
Second, we employed a specially tailored and fully non-parametric framework, which is
rooted in popular Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978). By
using a robust (i.e., allowing for outlying observations; Cazals et al., 2002) and conditional
(i.e., allowing for heterogeneity; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007) e¢ ciency framework, we were
able to evaluate non-parametrically (i.e., without any a priori assumption on the production
function) how discrete and continuous exogenous variables are correlated with productive
e¢ ciency (although this does not necessarily allow causal inferences). We thereby included
the operational environment immediately in the e¢ ciency estimates, thus avoiding use of a
separability condition, which inappropriately assumes that the exogenous environment is not
linked with the inputs and outputs.
Third, relying on a large political economy and public choice literature, we used the
above framework to examine how political economy factors are related to e¢ ciency of local
public good provision. Our ndings - using data on 290 Flemish local public libraries -
suggest that library productive e¢ ciency is higher when (1) the ideological stance of the local
government is more left-wing, (2) the population is wealthier, (3) the area is more densely
populated and (4) public service revenues derive to a larger extent from local resources.
In addition, our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, (5) population size, (6) the share of
female representatives in the local council, and (7) having a female mayor shows no signicant
correlation to library performances.
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